



BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:40 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Church, Aiken, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Holt and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have the Secretary of State here to continue the briefing on various matters of interest to the committee. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you here this morning.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to initiate a statement on your own or merely continue the questions which were in the course of being asked when we last met?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to inform the committee that Mr. [Nicholas] Katzenbach, the Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. Robert Hurwitch within the Department of State, who between them know everything that is known about this Cuban prisoner exchange, would be available to the committee in response to Senator Hickenlooper's request.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Katzenbach and who?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Robert Hurwitch of the Department of State. The committee asked me to ascertain who would be in a position to come up here, who would know all about the situation and those are the two who would be available to the committee, and who do know all about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there was a piece in the paper that I wondered if you cared to comment on which I think might clarify a bit for the committee.

AIR SUPPORT FOR BAY OF PIGS INVASION

The AP about 2 days ago said,

A Cuban invasion leader says his forces had never been promised U.S. air support in their ill-starred landing at the Bay of Pigs.

"We had our own planes, but they were knocked out," said Jose A. Perez San Roman, commander of the 2506th Cuban Liberation Brigade.

Is that, in your opinion, a correct statement?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, it was made very specifically clear to the brigade ahead of time that U.S. Armed Forces would not be committed in their support. The whole thesis of that operation was that the brigade as well as elements on the island, and the refugee groups here felt utterly confident and this turned out not to be right that the landing itself would precipitate reactions throughout the island. But we went to great pains to be sure that the brigade did understand that U.S. Armed Forces would not be used to support their landing.

Now, it is also true that in terms of the deficiencies of information that turned up after the event, that the count of planes on the island from sources on the island as well as other resources, turned out to be inaccurate. There were some planes in hangars and so forth that were not hit with the strike that did take place, and more planes, in fact, turned out from the Cuban side than had been anticipated.

The CHAIRMAN. It is fair to say then that our intelligence as to the situation in Cuba was defective, inaccurate?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it was inaccurate, but it was intelligence that was built by both sides, that is, by the U.S. effort intelligence and also by the Cuban effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The Cuban group itself, and the Cuban refugees and Cubans on the island helped put together the picture and put together their own picture about what the prospects were, but it is true that the brigade did know ahead of time. In fact as it turned out we used more U.S. forces than had ever been promised, particularly in extricating a great many who had to be extricated.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the record, I want to put that little piece in there just as a matter of historical significance. I have never seen an accurate correct statement by one of the Cubans.

[The clipping referred to follows:]

U.S. PROMISED NO AIR SUPPORT, CUBAN INVASION LEADER SAYS

WASHINGTON (AP).—A Cuban invasion leader says his forces had never been promised U.S. air support in their ill-starred landing at the Bay of Pigs.

"We had our own planes but they were knocked out," said Jose A. Perez San Roman, commander of the 2506th Cuban Liberation Brigade, in an interview Friday in Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy's outer office.

Whether the United States had promised air cover for the invasion and then had failed to deliver was one of the most controversial issues raised in the turmoil following the invasion's failure in 1961.

The Kennedy administration has maintained an official silence on that point.

One invasion veteran, Manuel Penabaz, wrote in a news magazine that during the invasion Perez San Roman had called unsuccessfully for jet cover. He said the appeal had been made in communication with an American ship, but that the rebels "looked in vain for the air support that could have knocked Castro's planes from the sky."

Perez San Roman, who with five comrades dropped in on the attorney general, was asked about this by newsmen and he shook his head.

When asked if he had ever received indications the United States would supply air cover, he shrugged and then repeated: "No. We had our own."

But he begged off answering further questions about the venture.

The 32-year-old brigade commander was among the 1,113 prisoners ransomed from Cuba Christmas Eve after more than 20 months in prison camps.

POLITICAL PROPAGANDA

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable I would like to say a few more words about the Cuban situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The committee might wish for me to read the October 26th letter from Mr. Khrushchev.

Senator MORSE. Before you do that. This story, I am sorry I was late, but I was in a very important conference and I could not get here. Does this story that you put in the record deal with this subject matter?

The CHAIRMAN. It is an Associated Press story, an interview with one of the leaders in the brigade at the Bay of Pigs where he says they had not been promised air support by the U.S. Government. They had their own planes.

Senator MORSE. I don't argue for a minute. I think it is important to have cleared up that this administration has been unnecessarily damaged by some very false propaganda about this air coverage. Of course, the hearings conducted at the time, you will recall by my subcommittee, left no room for doubt. The testimony of witness after witness after witness was that there was no such air coverage promised at any time. This got into the 1962 campaign and it became explosive in my state because my opponent used this big lie technique and I got into a television debate with him. I did not quote from the record, but I took that transcript of the record onto that stage with me and I said, "I hold in my hand a top secret document that contains the testimony of this group of witnesses," and I named them, "And I give to the people of Oregon my word of honor that they give a rebuttal and denial to any such statement of my opponent. Now, I want him to tell this audience where he got this information."

It has been this kind of political propaganda that has been used against this administration for the last time in this state as far as the senior Senator from Oregon is concerned, and he said he relied on U.S. News and World Report, Time Magazine and Readers' Digest. I just want to tell you his campaign collapsed then and there on this matter. I want to say to the Secretary, I do think that this point ought to be cleared up officially, because it is a disservice not only to President Kennedy but a disservice to President Eisenhower. Let's not fool ourselves what this project was, it was a combined Eisenhower-Kennedy program, and we carried on where Eisenhower left off, and I am glad the Senator from Arkansas has put this in the record.

Although we still don't have permission to release this material, here is one Senator who is going to answer it with this denial whenever I run into it, because I don't intend to have my Administration libeled this way by this kind of big lie technique that is used by our opposition on the Bay of Pigs matter. We did not promise air coverage. It never was promised, at least if we can rely on the testimony of the witnesses who testified before this committee, and I intend to spike it every time it is raised.

The CHAIRMAN. The only significance I thought was that this was testimony of one of the leaders of the brigade itself. That was all.

INVADERS DIRECTED BY U.S. SHIPS

Senator LAUSCHE. What about the correctness of the article carried in U.S. News written by one of the participants in the landing who got away and said that they were being directed by United States ships of what they should do once they landed, "Move forward and hold." Did you read that piece?

Secretary RUSK. I did not read that piece, Senator, but this is not correct. There were some United States ships off shore, far off shore. Indeed, there was some radar and other protection given from a distance to these people on their way in, but the operation was entirely under the direction of the commander of the Cuban Brigade.

Senator LAUSCHE. In that article it is stated that they were in constant touch with the ship offshore and the ship offshore was directing them how to move. Why would that have been done? Why were these communications in existence?

Secretary RUSK. There were several ships involved with the brigade, under the brigade command including supply ships.

Senator LAUSCHE. No. But this was a ship of the United States telling these people how they should proceed into the interior.

Secretary RUSK. This is news to me.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have the U.S. News piece on that item?

Mr. HOLT. I have read it and I will see if we have got it here.

A POPULAR UPRISING IN CUBA

Senator SPARKMAN. While we are looking that up, Senator Morse, I am not sure you heard the Secretary say this, which was likewise verified in the hearings before the committee, that it was the belief both of the refugees and apparently of our intelligence that when they went in and landed there would be a popular uprising in the island. If you remember, Mr. [Allen] Dulles 5 or 6 months before, maybe further back than that, while we were in session in 1960, testified before us that it was proceeding on that assumption, and that the invasion, if it came, when it came, would be made only on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN. I heard him personally state this, also in an executive meeting downtown, that their intelligence, their reports, indicated there would be that uprising.

Senator SPARKMAN. He testified right before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

Senator SPARKMAN. Before you start, I wonder if I could ask one or two questions. I am going to have to leave very briefly within a few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Both of us have to go for a few minutes. We have a meeting.

RECONCILIATION PLAN IN THE CONGO

Senator SPARKMAN. I just wonder if you will tell us what is the Congo situation today.

The CHAIRMAN. The latest.

Senator SPARKMAN. You notice I said today.

The CHAIRMAN. I say this morning.

Secretary RUSK. I am very pleased I cautioned the committee that it might be different by the end of the day and it was different by the end of the day.

Senator SPARKMAN. Before you left the room.

Secretary RUSK. It is true as of today, Mr. Tshombe sent a letter yesterday to Mr. Adoula and to the U.N. saying that he was prepared to proceed with the reconciliation plan, to grant the U.N. forces freedom of movement throughout the Congo which would open up the way to secure the very valuable facilities at Kolwezi against demolition, but asked for amnesty for himself and his followers from Adoula.

Adoula, somewhat to our surprise, because he has been riding high in the last few days, has been somewhat difficult, Adoula responded very constructively to that. He and Kasavubu issued a letter reaffirming the amnesty, and the problem now is where Tshombe and Adoula or Adoula's representative can get together to work out further talks. Tshombe has indicated he is returning to Elizabethville. Adoula himself does not wish to go to Elizabethville but a high-ranking representative would be ready to go. Both of them might meet in some mid place between Leopoldville and Elizabethville.

TEAMWORK AMONG BELGIUM, BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES

Perhaps I ought to say to the committee that there has been much closer teamwork among Belgium, Britain and the United States in this situation than has appeared on the public record. The Belgians and the British have taken on the job of trying to advise and persuade Tshombe to accept a plan. We have tried to take on the job of persuading Adoula and the U.N. to keep on the plan, and leave the way open for a Katanga peacefully under Tshombe and his government, to join a federal Congo.

This has left us in a somewhat different public position as we have carried out these respective roles, but I can tell the committee we have worked most intimately with Mr. Spaak¹ who has been extremely helpful here in this situation. We have had for a few days some problem of communications and possibly of discipline, between the U.N. Secretary General and certain of his leaders on the spot. When Ralph Bunche went out to make a thorough investigation of this he came back and seemed convinced that it was more a matter of communications than discipline, but we have tried on the one side to keep the U.N. and Adoula nailed to the reconciliation plan, and the Belgians and British have worked mostly with Tshombe.

It looks today that the prospects are promising—but I will have to enter the same reservation when I was with the committee before.

If we could get the threat of the destruction of those important facilities at Kolwezi removed, then I think the way would be open for a much more reasonable kind of negotiated settlement.

One of our problems has been that we have had to put great pressure on Adoula to get him to realize that the facts of the situa-

¹ NATO Director General Paul-Henri Spaak.

tion are such that Tshombe is not just another provincial president, that in fact what is needed is a negotiated and agreed solution between Adoula and Tshombe. It has been hard to nail down in Leopoldville just as it has been hard for the Belgians and the British to get Tshombe nailed down in Elizabethville, but that is the present situation.

Mr. Chairman, if the committee is agreeable I might continue the Cuban discussion briefly. I would like to read to the committee the October 26th letter which has been so mysterious during all this business.

The CHAIRMAN. Please do it now before we have to leave.

Secretary RUSK. Ail right, sir, and then perhaps I would like to go into the de Gaulle situation. I have some copies of the de Gaulle press conference and I think some members of the committee might wish to read that because it is—

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest as we take up these subjects we deal with them separately until we have concluded one subject, that is, if we take up the Cuban situation let's proceed with that. And if we take up the Katanga, let's proceed with that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right with me.

KENNEDY'S WARNING TO THE SOVIET UNION

Secretary RUSK. I will remind the committee of the President's press conferences of September 4 and September 13 in which it seemed to us that a very clear warning had been given to the Soviet Union, that the gravest issues would arise if the Soviet Union put anything like offensive strategic missiles on the island of Cuba. Further, that the Soviet Union had told us quite specifically that there are not and would not be in Cuba any missiles capable of reaching the United States.

The October 22 speech of the President was delivered to the Soviet Ambassador here in Washington an hour before the speech was delivered, and the next morning the Soviet counterblast was similarly delivered, each with a very brief letter of transmittal. The communications that followed that largely passed through the Secretary General of the United Nations who came in urging both sides to take no steps which would further exacerbate the situation.

On October 25, the President sent a letter to the Secretary General saying:

I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday. As we made clear in the Security Council, the existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.

In your message, in your statement, to the Security Council last night you made certain suggestions and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured.

Then further,

At the same time a very brief message—we would not have described it as a letter—went to the Soviet foreign office through our embassy in Moscow on the same day making the point that we had been given most specific assurances on this matter of missiles. In the face of a solemn warning by the President of the United States, these assurances had turned out to be false; that it was not the United

States that issued the first challenge in this situation and we expected the Soviet Union to take the steps to restore this situation.

KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER TO KENNEDY

Then on October 26, we got a long message from Mr. Khrushchev. I am able to read this letter on the understanding that it will not be quoted or used in anyway without consultation with the Secretary of State.

He said:

I have received your letter of October 26—

We are not sure whether he is talking about the letter to U Thant or the message that passed through the embassy which was not strictly speaking a letter—

From your letter, I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and some sense of responsibility. I value this.

Now, we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would judge that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

The reference to a secret letter was with reference to this letter, I think, because this was transmitted to us as a secret letter.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, Communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We Communists are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means for the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples.

I think I will warn the committee this is a rather somewhat agitated and somewhat discursive kind of letter.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with us, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace.

I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, or understanding of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty patience, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everything sowing death and destruction.

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your conclusions regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different estimates of these or those military means. Indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take, for example, a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number or troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for

infantry to attack. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not quarrel now. It is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this. But I say to you, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand. Can one attack, if one has on one's territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction. But one cannot attack with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can attack. Without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to that effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All this means located, there and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can attack you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that one can think that it is possible to attack thus. I say precisely attack, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you, too, will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect action which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this.

We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you, we have differences on ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful co-existence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the scene which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these cargoes are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

At the time this was given, seven of their vessels were already on the way home, the one that I told you last time we were especially interested in.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me.

Incidentally, also in the background, the bases were continuing to be constructed while this letter was received here. In other words, the buildup was going on.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions. It is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful co-existence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the acting Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted—and we are ready to enter such negotiations—and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly. You have asked what happened, what evokes the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke about it in Vienna—that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake.

This was at Vienna. My recollection was he said it was more than a mistake, it was a failure.

I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, pointing out that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we, too, possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the reciprocal claims, but a world-wide cruel and destructive war.

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is, we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. We were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The U.S.A. participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants in the aggression against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General Graves, who, at that time, commanded the U.S. expeditionary corps. Graves called it "The American Adventure in Siberia."

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counter-revolutionary immigrants, that you support them and you would help them to realize their plans against the present Government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hang over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban Government to furnish the aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the U.S.A. itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden

for every people. Then too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but all other armaments, as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet Government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore, show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive piratical actions, which you have declared the U.S.A. intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognise your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand peril of what terrible forces our countries dispossess.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I expressed gratitude for Mr. Bertrand Russell, too, who manifests alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and I readily responded to the appeal of the acting Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours.

PUBLIC LETTER OF OCTOBER 27

Now let me comment, gentlemen, that while we were still studying this letter, the public letter of October 27 came in proposing the Turkish deal relating to the NATO bases.

Since that was a public letter we thought we ought to reply publicly, both as a matter of information and as a matter of time, but we elected to reply to this letter of October 26, but you will have observed that our outgoing letter of October 27, the public letter that I showed you last time did not find a precise equivalent in its terms in this letter.

What we did there was to try to pull as much as possible out of this letter, but to be precise about the pre-conditions for what we were saying, so you couldn't get a contract between this letter and out letter of October 27, nor indeed, between our letter of October 27 and Khrushchev's letter of October 28. The problem, I think, is

not a contractual problem, but a political problem. There was a matter which, I am sure the committee realizes, was being handled at the time under the contingent threat of a nuclear war, and we, I think, read more into this letter than was there, but nevertheless we did so in order to try to move the matter forward another step in a way that would conform to our interests.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I see the letter of the 26th while you are talking?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you.

KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, have you studied Chairman Khrushchev's speech of yesterday?

Secretary RUSK. He made a speech, I think, early this morning, the long speech.

Senator AIKEN. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. He made some comments at the airport yesterday. I have not had a chance to study the full text on that. In that he claimed a victory in Cuba.

Senator AIKEN. That is what I was going to ask you.

Secretary RUSK. And at the same time pointed out, I think, for the benefit of the Chinese who were sitting on the platform that the United States has 40,000 nuclear weapons. You see, he had made the earlier remark publicly that this paper tiger that the Chinese talk about has nuclear teeth and he apparently underlined that today.

Senator AIKEN. Apparently China took exception to that letter of October 26, if you were speaking for the socialist countries, you would.

Secretary RUSK. Very sharply.

SOVIETS ARE RELUCTANT TO MAKE LETTER PUBLIC

It is interesting also to me that the Soviets are very reluctant to make this letter public. Our understanding of that is that this was dictated personally by Mr. Khrushchev under conditions of considerable strain, that it was not cleared through the upper echelons of the Politburo.

Senator AIKEN. It sounds like a man-to-man letter.

Secretary RUSK. It is a man-to-man letter, but was also written under some pressure.

Senator MORSE. It is obvious.

Secretary RUSK. As I told the committee the last time you cannot construct a contract out of those exchanges because you do not meet each other head on. Each was a progression of each other.

Senator MORSE. It is an imaginative study in psychology.

Secretary RUSK. It is, indeed.

Senator MORSE. Any further questions on this letter?

Senator AIKEN. No, not on this matter.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you want to go through the process of asking questions on the letter or let him proceed?

Senator MORSE. He might be turning perhaps to another subject.

Senator RUSK. I think perhaps if we could pause here to get into those aspects of the Cuban questions which the committee might want to pursue before I go into the de Gaulle letter.

KHRUSHCHEV ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR

Senator AIKEN. You have not received the text of the Khrushchev's speech this morning?

Secretary RUSK. Just a few pages of it, Senator, and I haven't had a chance to study it. On the Cuban matter he said:

The superior influence of socialism and peace has been demonstrated in the Caribbean. The U.S. imperialists had to proclaim publicly that they would abstain from aggression. Those who said socialism suffered a defeat have a peculiar logic. The Cuban people want to build socialism. The U.S. imperialists had to be shown that they must expect a thermonuclear counterblow if they struck against Cuba. The U.S. Government had to renounce armed intervention against Cuba. This was a victory for peaceful co-existence and the policy of preventing the export of counter-revolution.

The Soviet Union has made a concession, and so have the imperialists. The Soviet Union wanted to protect Cuba from aggression: this aim has been achieved. With the Cuban people, the Soviet Union made the United States abstain from aggression on Cuba.

The Soviet Union has never intended to launch a thermonuclear attack on the United States. It does not matter where the rockets are located. They can be used with equal prospect of success wherever they are.

Senator AIKEN. What was that last statement?

Secretary RUSK [reading]:

The Soviet Union has never intended to launch a thermonuclear attack on the United States. It does not matter where the rockets are located. They can be used with equal prospect of success wherever they are.

The United States has 40,000 nuclear charges and bombs. The USSR also has more than enough. The consequences of nuclear and thermonuclear war would last for many generations. The capitalists would perish. But would the socialist countries win? Marxist-Leninists cannot imagine the building of socialism on such devastated and poisoned ground. I want to give away a secret: Our scientists have tried out a 100-megaton bomb. Such means are at the disposal of man. Such means can be used only outside Europe.

It is an interesting paragraph.

DEPARTURE OF SOVIETS FROM CUBA

Senator MORSE. In your letter of the 26th, Mr. Secretary, there are many significant comments. His comment about the Russians in Cuba, I think, is a very important handle to take hold of in support of the position you took the other day; after all, we have made very clear that the threat to the United States including not only missiles but other threats were conditions that would have to be met before we were bound not to protect our security by an invasion, if necessary.

Secretary RUSK. After we got the commitment on the bombers, and they started moving out, we have been pressing continuously on the additional military personnel. I told the committee the last time that our traffic continues but it is not continuing at the rate we would like to see and that is the present issue we are now pushing with the Soviet Union.

Senator MORSE. Do you have any questions on Cuba now?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I do.

WHAT WAS OUR MISTAKE?

If we did not participate in the landing, invasion, and did not promise coverage, what was our mistake that we have been apologizing for?

Secretary RUSK. At the time I said to this committee that any action of this type and scale cannot realistically be conducted as a covert operation. Looking back on it in retrospect, I think we were guilty of being too optimistic about it—what would happen in Cuba if this particular landing occurred, and that the purely refugee aspect of it, the covert aspect of it was something that we in any event would be responsible for. Therefore, our decision ought more clearly to have been at that time, in retrospect, Senator, either not to do it or do it all the way.

Senator LAUSCHE. You see here Khrushchev says, "I spoke about it in Vienna that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed as a result of which many Cubans perished. You"—that is the President—"yourself told me then that this had been a mistake."

Secretary RUSK. The President had said that to our own people.

Senator LAUSCHE. I know. But what was the mistake if we were not participants.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we were not participating against the island with our own armed forces directly, but the mistake was to have as much responsibility for it as we did, and either misjudged the situation on the island or failed to follow up.

SEA AND AIR COVERAGE TO THE INVASION

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, [Allen] Dulles appeared before our committee and told us about the training of these refugees at Guatemala. Let me ask: Was there a time, as far as you know, either during the Eisenhower or the Kennedy administration, in which we did contemplate giving them sea and air coverage?

Secretary RUSK. That was always one of the alternatives, and this was looked at in the Kennedy Administration, as it, I think, had been looked at at one time in the Eisenhower Administration.

But let me make this remark, Senator, on that point. I think there was another mistake that was made. We in Washington understood that this brigade was determined to go into Cuba, and that the brigade itself said that if we do run into any serious trouble we will immediately move into guerrilla type action, therefore we are not concerned about just what might happen at the beach-head.

Now, when the time came, apparently much to our amazement and surprise, we were then informed by the brigade leadership that they had not been trained for guerrilla action, therefore, they could not undertake that course of action. I mean this again was one of the elements of mistake made.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was the equipment of war which they had supplied by our Government?

Secretary RUSK. It was supplied by a number of governments and also from the private services in some instances.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then there was in contemplation, two courses, one not to give them air and sea cover, and the other to give it to them?

Secretary RUSK. There were several alternatives that were looked at, of course. One was to call the whole thing off, and do everything we could to prevent it from occurring.

Another was to let it go forward on the basis that the brigade itself had fully understood and on the basis of its own assurances if they got ashore that the Cuban people would begin to take things into their own hands promptly. Indeed, they had information that particular commanders in different parts of the island would in effect defect at that point, which turned out not to be possible or true whichever the situation was on the spot.

The third would be just on the basis of the brigade itself to move in with U.S. forces.

I think had there been widespread significant disorders on the island, that we almost certainly would have had an appeal from important Cuban elements in the island to come to their assistance; that might have changed the situation on that particular judgment at that time.

Senator LAUSCHE. My understanding was it was felt, if the invasion showed some signs of success, that there then would have been revolt and uprising, but since there was no sign of success all of those who were ready to rise up went for cover.

Secretary RUSK. This was a question of timing and also a question of security ahead of time.

NO U.S. FORCES WOULD TAKE PART

Senator LAUSCHE. When was the decision finally made not to give them air or sea cover?

Secretary RUSK. That was made substantially before any operation, anything was done at all. In other words, this was the understanding from the beginning in terms of anything that was actually done with respect to the invasion itself.

In other words, no overt act was taken by anybody in relation to this invasion or its preparation or movement of the brigade or anything of that sort except on the understanding that U.S. forces were not going to take part.

Senator LAUSCHE. What were our ships doing out there? What was their part in the matter?

Secretary RUSK. We had, as I recall, certain naval vessels in the Caribbean, who were prepared to relay information if the other side's air cover, for example, discovered these forces before the actual landing. There probably would have been an abort of the invasion plans had they been discovered by Cuban air. Our vessels were in the Caribbean anyhow in that general area, but they were there on station some distances from Cuba to give a radar screen to the forces coming in.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know whether or not our ships there were in communication with these troops when they landed and were telling them what to do?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not believe that this point which was reported involved any U.S. naval vessels. You see, there were

several vessels with the brigade that stood offshore; there were some supply vessels, for example, and there was a communications vessel, and I think that must have been referring to one of those vessels.

Senator LAUSCHE. My recollection is that this man who wrote this story states that they were in contact with United States ships and that the United States ships told them exactly what to do, "Move forward. Wait. Wait," and this piece rather vividly and pointedly says that they were waiting for the coverage and never got it. I am not going to question on this further.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator—

Senator MORSE. Did you want to say something, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. I just wanted to say I am not clear on every exact detail because I simply have not refreshed my memory on this episode for a year now, but I could look into any precise points you wished me to look into.

COVERT SUPPORT

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. If we did not have participation or a guilty feeling why did our Government go to the extent of getting together \$50 million worth of goods to buy these men out for ransom?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it is one thing to commit the U.S. armed forces in uniform overtly into an undertaking of this sort, and another thing to support it and know about it and wish it well covertly. I mean one of the great mistakes that was made that we did not sufficiently appreciate that you cannot undertake an operation of this scale covertly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it fair to assume there is a feeling of guilt and that we did have an obligation to these 1250 men to get them ransomed, because of what we did?

Secretary RUSK. I feel it, Senator, because I feel that I could have stopped it had I wanted to and, therefore, I was glad to see these prisoners come out of Cuba, I will tell you very frankly. Whether you call it guilt or not, I would say the most unfortunate thing about it was that it was a failure. I don't think we need any feeling of guilt so far as Castro is concerned.

Senator LAUSCHE. Oh yes, I agree, once having tolerated it we should never have permitted it to fail.

Senator AIKEN. Did you say you could have stopped it?

Secretary RUSK. I think the United States Government could have stopped it, yes.

Senator AIKEN. They did stop it the first of November, 1960, when they first wanted to attack?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the brigade apparently had on several different occasions wanted to do things that they were not fully trained for.

Senator AIKEN. I think they planned to invade about four or five days before the election of 1960 which was a heck of a time for an invasion, in my opinion.

Secretary RUSK. In all candor, I would simply have to say that the United States Government could have stopped it.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead, I yield.

ULTIMATE SOURCE OF EQUIPMENT

Senator WILLIAMS. You said that equipment was supplied by several countries. What other countries participated in arming these men other than ourselves?

Secretary RUSK. Guatemala, Nicaragua, I think Costa Rica; I would have to recheck this, Senator.

Senator WILLIAMS. It was my understanding that the equipment that they furnished to them in turn came from us, and some of it we siphoned through those countries but in reality it was all our equipment anyway.

Senator RUSK. I think the ultimate source of the equipment was the United States under our various military assistance programs, but there was some assistance furnished that had not been furnished specifically for the brigade.

Senator WILLIAMS. Predominantly it was U.S. equipment?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. Who furnished the vessels? Were they American vessels?

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure under what flag they were sailing, but they were leased or bought as a part of the general undertaking.

Senator WILLIAMS. In other words, we were furnishing the bulk of the equipment and means for getting it over there.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct. I would not deny that, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Is it true, Mr. Secretary, that a large portion of the equipment was collected and furnished to this refugee group while the Eisenhower Administration was still in office?

Secretary RUSK. A considerable, very considerable part of it was, and the whole training program was laid on then, and it was organized as a brigade in 1960 with this kind of possibility in mind.

A JOINT ENTERPRISE OF TWO ADMINISTRATIONS

Senator MORSE. As far as the White House is concerned, looking back it in retrospect, this, in fact, was a joint enterprise of two White House administrations.

Secretary RUSK. I think the idea, the organization, training of the brigade, the equipment, those things were participated in by two administrations through the covert channels. But when you get to the actual point of the Bay of Pigs only one administration was in position to make the decision.

Senator MORSE. I understand, the Kennedy Administration was in power. I don't want to spend more time on it. But it may be that a good purpose can be served by this committee going further into the problem.

Secretary RUSK. I think there is one thing, Senator, that gave us great distress at the time in terms of what was wise to do, and this has been borne out by the conduct of the brigade in prison and since they have returned. They were utterly determined to go to Cuba, utterly determined, and the consequences of saying to this brigade, "Just disband and go and get jobs," and that sort of thing,

were considered to be very bad in terms of the whole morale of the entire anti-Castro Cuban community everywhere, and I think, this perhaps was valued too highly in terms of taking a realistic assessment of exactly what could surely be accomplished under all the circumstances.

But the real fire in this, the real drive in it came out of that brigade. It was an astonishing thing to see how this operated at the time.

A CIA PROGRAM

Senator MORSE. I don't want to argue the point or go into it at length, but I want to make this observation, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin America, I have held to the point of view that there was a very close working relationship between the CIA and the refugees, the exiled group, as far as covert program was concerned.

We faced the fact that it was part of a covert program of our government over a period of many months. I am speaking off the top of my head, but I think the record is correct that the testimony disclosed that in the neighborhood of \$40 million were spent on this project by the Eisenhower Administration and somewhat better than \$5 million by the Kennedy Administration in its final execution, but I have always felt, Mr. Secretary, that the evidence was pretty clear that this was pretty much a CIA program. That is water over the dam.

I am concerned about another matter which at some future date I think you ought to discuss with the full committee or my subcommittee and that is this whole problem of our relationships with the refugees in this country and what can be done to see to it that under existing treaties, binding upon the United States, we are not confronted some day with a course of action on the part of the refugees that is going to embarrass us with our Latin American allies. One of the points raised in conversations with me by ambassadors from Latin America and by executives of Latin America when I am down there is their concern that the exiles in this country are going to follow a course of action that is going to make a very embarrassing situation for them and they are going to be called upon to give support to some precipitous action on the part of some group of refugees that we don't keep under control.

KEEP REFUGEES UNDER CONTROL

I am all for giving them sanctuary and all for giving them help consistent with our treaty obligations. I am not sure, Mr. Secretary, that this committee is fully apprised as yet as to what steps are being taken by our government to keep these refugees under some reasonable check and control. Under international law my curbstone opinion is that, if we permit a group of exiles in our country to follow an aggressive course of action against a Communist state or any other state and tolerate it, we implicate ourselves and we may very well find ourselves in the next Latin American conference comparable with Punta del Este in an embarrassing situation.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think we have, with the full understanding of the other American states, taken the view that at this stage we should not encourage or permit wholly fruitless mosquito bite kind of things that cannot contribute to anything.

For example, the Alpha 66 millimeter shots at a hotel accomplishes nothing. In the whole, on a system we are discussing, where do we go from here?

One interesting development, Senator, I think will be of great interest to the committee, the non-Communist liberal or even non-Communist left in Latin America is taking a very keen interest now in what can be done about Castro—People like Bosch, Betancourt, Figueres,² indeed, the present Government of Costa Rica—and this is having its effect internally in a number of countries.

I just got a message this morning that the La Paz teachers union has ousted the Communist leadership by a vote of five to one. That teachers union has been under Communist control for years.

If the non-Communist left gives some serious thought to this, they also have resources in Cuba and this might open up some very interesting possibilities along with the moderates and conservatives.

A GREAT DIPLOMATIC ACHIEVEMENT

Senator CHURCH. I suppose it is part of our function here to be skeptics and that is frequently the character of the dialog between us.

Secretary RUSK. Please.

Senator CHURCH. But I want to depart from that role and also depart from the Bay of Pigs for a moment to say to you that I think we all appreciate that we have come through as perilous a crisis as has ever confronted the country because it involved the imminent possibility of an all-out nuclear war, and the most sobering confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and I, for one, feel that the President and his advisers, of which you were a principal among them, handled that situation with consummate skill.

We were faced with a mortal threat that we had to remove. You defined, the President defined, that threat accurately, insisted upon the removal of the missiles that had to go, and did it under circumstances on a world checkerboard where the delineation was made in such form that we had not only had a queen, we had a handful of queens. I think that history is going to mark up the success as one of the great diplomatic achievements of the United States, and I just personally want to express to you my profound admiration of the way you handled it.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator, I appreciate it very much. I would only like to comment that any of us who saw the President during this period could not help but be deeply comforted with the clarity and the calm that he brought to bear in what was the most frightful decision which the President has had to make in the United States, but it was also a great assurance to him in these

² Juan Bosch, President of the Dominican Republic; Romulo Betancourt, President of Venezuela; and Jose Figueres, President of Costa Rica.

trying times that the leadership of the country recognized the danger, and that the people and the leaders on both sides of the aisle showed a calm and a resoluteness that I think made a deep impression in Moscow.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed with the questions?

CASTRO SHOULD BE REMOVED

Senator MORSE. Let me make this one observation.

I simply want to share Senator Church's comments and associate myself with them, and I want to say that I think the work that you did in that crisis in support, the right arm of the President, will go down in history as a great monument to you. I think you did a magnificent job. I am very proud of you for it and if Frank would permit this additional statement, Bosch said to us the other night, speaking to us on the Castro situation, on the interest of Latin American leaders and his perpetuation, said in effect, I paraphrase him, "One of the great problems is this man's longevity, that the longer he stays in power the greater tendency there is in other Latin American areas for leftists to say, 'Well, you see you can survive,' and you have got to weather this storm, you have got to wait it out and you can survive and eventually we will have our revolutionary victory," and that is why Bosch said to us, "We think it is so important that at the earliest possible date Castro be removed."

NEGOTIATIONS APART FROM THE LETTERS

Senator LAUSCHE. I am directing your attention to this communication of the 26th sent by Khrushchev, and having listened to you reading it I cull from it the following that is important from the standpoint of an agreement.

If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the U.S.A. itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba evidently would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armament would disappear.

Now, going on to the next page, there is this further statement:

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose we for our part will declare that our ships bound to Cuba will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

May I ask whether there were any negotiations carried on between the 26th and 27th separate and apart from the letter that the President wrote in answer to the letter?

Secretary RUSK. There was the public letter of the 27th from the Soviet Union about NATO bases and the White House statement of the 27th on that particular letter.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Well now, then, on the 27th the President writes, I am not going to read the whole letter, "Assuming this is done promptly—"

Secretary RUSK. Senator, would you excuse me just a moment, Senator Morse, I have a full copy of President de Gaulle's press conference, you might want a full copy.

Senator MORSE. The President has called me and I have got to go.

Secretary RUSK. I have other copies here. Excuse me.

ANSWERING KHRUSHCHEV'S PROPOSAL

Senator LAUSCHE. In the letter of the 27th the President states to Khrushchev:

You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United States observation and supervision and undertake with suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. We, on our part, would agree upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a), to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

I assume that these two paragraphs, identified by the figures, one and two, are reflective of what you thought answered the proposal, the President thought answered the proposal, of Khrushchev for the solution of the problem?

Secretary RUSK. But only reflective, Senator, would you mind just reading the sentence in which the October 26th letter is referred to there at the top of the paper you have?

Senator LAUSCHE [reading]:

I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and welcome the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable under the effective United Nations arrangements.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think there also was a reference there too "along the lines of your letter of October 26."

Do you see that phrase there? In other words, we knew perfectly well that this letter of ours of October 27 did not meet Khrushchev's letter that I read to the committee this morning in any exact terms. We added conditions to it, and there were other things that we could not accept.

For example. Khrushchev said to us later that since he had told us that any arrangements would depend upon Castro's agreement, and since Castro had not agreed, that that relieved him of his obligations about on-site inspection and things of that sort. Those are basic conditions with us and we were not able to—

DID NOT REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's assume that the letter of the 27th and the letter of the President, and the letter of the 26th of Khrushchev did not reach a common understanding, that is the position taken by the Department.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. On the letter of the 28th again written by Khrushchev he states:

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962 that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba and not only on the

part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappeared. This in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

It is my understanding that there is another letter that the President wrote in reply to this letter of the 28th, may I see that? Doesn't that say specifically by the President—this is a letter of President Kennedy to Khrushchev dated October 28 and I will read the second paragraph.

Secretary RUSK. That was made public on the same day.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

"The distinguished efforts of acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks," this is the President speaking, "I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today,"—that is the letter of the 28th—"as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out."

I stop at that point. Doesn't this letter of the 28th state specifically that the President considered his commitment of no invasion, no toleration of other nations in the Western Hemisphere making an invasion as a firm commitment?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, just as the letter of October 27 from President Kennedy to Khrushchev was not on all fours with Khrushchev's letter of October 26, neither was Khrushchev's letter of October 28 exactly on all fours with our letter of the 27th. In other words, this understanding was more political than legal, and it was at a point where the primary objective was to get these missiles, these bombers out of Cuba.

Now, you would have to read, I think, in connection with this exchange, the letter which was sent by the Soviet Union and the United States by Secretary General U Thant the other day pointing out that it had not been possible to reach agreement on all of the elements involved in this situation and also you will note when the full text is available that Khrushchev in his Berlin speech today did not claim that he had an unequivocal, unconditional commitment with respect to Cuba from President Kennedy.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Now then, getting to another point—

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

SOVIET STRENGTH IN CUBA

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. How many technicians and troops of the Communists were in Cuba before the ground-to-air missiles were delivered, if you can answer?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to give an approximation, I would say in the order of 4 or 5,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. And there are now about 17,000?

Secretary RUSK. The 17,000 has been an increase based upon more recent estimates which fill out the tables of organization of units that we have identified as being there.

Senator LAUSCHE. So there are now 12,000 more Communist troops and technicians in Cuba than there were, I think, last August?

Secretary RUSK. Say, in August, to the best of our information.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many Russian MIGs and supersonic planes do we understand to be there now?

Secretary RUSK. I think MIGs on the order of about 70 of all categories. About 30, I think, are the MIG-21's.

Senator LAUSCHE. Those MIG's are capable, and supersonics are capable, of carrying atomic warheads and dropping them just as we dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, they have that technical capability.

Senator LAUSCHE. And they have—

Secretary RUSK. Just as our fighters of the same category have.

Senator LAUSCHE. Last week you testified that you believe there are no missiles now in Cuba and no atomic or hydrogen warheads, but you cannot say positively they are not there?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. I would not attempt to say to this committee that we are 100 percent certain that there is none of this there.

Senator LAUSCHE. When were the MIGs and these supersonic planes delivered into Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. In the period from July to October.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. So that since last July they have 70 planes of Russia newly there.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. Whether all 70 had come in since July or whether some had come in earlier I am not certain, but this is approximately correct.

POSSIBILITY OF ERROR

Senator LAUSCHE. With the inference that there are no warheads nor missiles there, there is, of course, the possibility of error in your information and deductions?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. We did make an error in evaluating the air strength of Cuba prior to the invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, that was a matter of a number of planes you could count on your fingers at that point.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, that is upsprung more planes than we thought were there.

Secretary RUSK. Than we had seen, yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't our position worse now than it was last August or last July in Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that is correct so long as we have up to 17,000 Soviet military personnel left on that island, yes, sir. That is in terms of what is there on the island, from that point of view the situation is worse. I think what has greatly changed has been the position of Castro in Cuba and throughout the hemisphere and the attitude of the hemisphere toward Castro. That has gone through a major change in this situation and I think will prove to be far more decisive than the actual military personnel.

ISOLATION OF THE CASTRO REGIME

Senator LAUSCHE. What is our program for the future, that is, is there going to be a right or a firm effort made to economically bring them down?

Secretary RUSK. The President made it clear when he visited members of the Cuban brigade that our purpose and objective must be the removal of the Castro regime from Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. That is not easy. On these questions it is going to take time and difficulty, but in the short run, now, we are working on that, as complete an isolation of the Castro regime as we can from the rest of the free world.

For example, free world shipping which was running about 72 a month, say back in August and September, is now down to 21.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And most of those are on long-term charter to the bloc and we have been making considerable headway on that. Trade has similarly dropped very rapidly between the free world and Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to express my judgment that the prime thing was to avoid an all-out involvement with missile and bomb fights. Now, on that I realize the gravity of the problem that you mentioned.

Secretary RUSK. Right, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all that I have on Cuba.

CLARIFICATION OF REMARKS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to clarify that answer. Would it be proper to quote you as saying that you think our conditions in Cuba are worse than they were?

Secretary RUSK. I was thinking more with respect to the presence of Soviet military personnel, but I immediately said after that—

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but confusion can come from that. What we really are concerned about is our over-all situation, isn't it?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Regarding Cuba, do you think it is worse now than it was last year?

Secretary RUSK. No, that is why I mentioned the other. I hope that a single sentence in an executive session would not be taken out of context.

The CHAIRMAN. It can be.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. Let me clarify it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it ought to be clarified.

Secretary RUSK. There has been a remarkable demonstration of the unity of the hemisphere with respect to Castro and this threat from the island.

The CHAIRMAN. Which you didn't have before.

Secretary RUSK. Which we didn't have before, and particularly in NATO we didn't have before. There has been a sharp reduction in the stature, the prestige and the danger from Castro as such in the hemisphere. His own prestige in the island has suffered. There are tensions between Castro and Moscow from which I think, we have

not heard the last. He apparently, even now with Khrushchev in East Germany, is trying to straddle the Chinese-Moscow dispute, which is something that will not be to Khrushchev's liking at all.

There are very important political and economic gains since August, but on the specific presence on the island of Soviet military personnel that is different.

CONVINCING THE SOVIETS OF AMERICAN RESOLVE

The CHAIRMAN. But wouldn't you go further and say that as a result of this confrontation, which really was a kind of testing, that this has convinced the Russians that this country is not going to be lax in standing up for its rights and it has had a very substantial effect on Khrushchev's attitude, not only here but everywhere as far as the seriousness of toying with nuclear weapons?

Secretary RUSK. I think I covered some of those byproducts at the last meeting, for example.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't want us to say we are worse off now than we were before. You can say there are more troops now than last year, but I think it is an insignificant debit in relation to overall.

Secretary RUSK. I thought the situation was related with respect to the question of troops on the island. But I did at the last time speak of other items, the great impact of this on other nonaligned countries and substantial shifts in their attitude and a good many positive elements.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it must be conceded that the psychological impact on the Western Hemisphere and the people around the world has been good.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. I just think this ought not be lost sight of in face of what you said, that we were worse off now than we were before. I think that letter of the 26th, it is discursive, it is difficult to pin it down, but it reveals a concern about precipitating a war more clearly and positively than anything else I have heard him say or write.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I would put it this way: The Russians are stronger in Cuba than they were a year ago, although perhaps not as strong as they were three months ago. However, I hope that we can deal with these international crises and situations without getting involved with the politics. I don't want to be forced into a position of pointing out the very bad situations which I know exist in order to counteract expressions of undue optimism which don't exist from somebody else. I think it is important that we don't get this whole international situation, and I am willing to tell the President so, too, in a position where perhaps part of us have to say things we don't want to to counteract things and to bring the facts before the public generally.

OPPOSITION TO SENDING TROOPS TO VIETNAM

There has been a trend toward real political involvement. I have seen the earmarks of it, and if I had the correct solution to the Cuban question, I would feel more free to criticize what has gone on. But I think we should worry about the next country, and there

is one, that could be another Cuba, to deal with that before it happens.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator, this is the important part of it because prevention is so much easier than cure.

Senator AIKEN. I am not satisfied with the Vietnam situation and unless I am pushed I don't publicize it, but I don't like the idea of our sending combat troops in there, but they are on their way.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions, Senator Williams?

Senator LAUSCHE. Not on the Cuban situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman, any more on Cuba?

What would you like to hear?

DE GAULLE AND THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I think the committee might be interested in hearing a brief discussion of de Gaulle and the European situation because this is going to be very much in the headlines for the next several days.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.

Secretary RUSK. We have had for, well, since he came into office, some very serious problems in knowing how to work effectively with President de Gaulle.

In 1958 he proposed to President Eisenhower, for example, that there be constituted a formal structure, tripartite structure, of the U.S., U.K. and France, which would establish a special relationship as the leadership of the free world constituting a sort of a directorate of the free world. President Eisenhower, at that time, offered him the maximum consultation, offered to reinforce our embassy in Paris or in London or invite them to do the same in Washington, to facilitate the most continuous and broadest consultation on every conceivable subject in order that our three governments could work a little more closely together.

But what President Eisenhower felt he could not do and what we feel we could not do is constitute a formal structure of three countries and say to the rest of the world, "We are the chancellors-in-chief of the free world and everybody else is in a secondary position."

Now, General de Gaulle did not accept these counterproposals in 1958 because he is more interested in the structure and form than he is in the substance of consultation, I make that one point. Secondly, General de Gaulle is a man who has seen his country live through a traumatic experience during his own lifetime. No one who was a great patriot as he was could live through the event, perhaps, of the beginning of World War II and not come away deeply scarred by the loss of the morale and the political integrity of the French nation.

REVIVING FRENCH PRESTIGE AND MORALE

In addition to that he has had an army which first suffered a stunning defeat at the beginning of World War II and has fought all over the world a series of losing battles, in the judgment of the army, not for France. So he has had a problem of the inner morale, the discipline and the national feeling of his own armed forces to think about.